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The incomparable geographic location of Rhodes in the south-east of the 
Aegean Sea, where it formed part of the Dodecanese, meant that in its long and 
fertile history the island played a fundamental role as a melting pot of different 
cultures and a geostrategic enclave of the first order. As far as the classical peri-
od is concerned, in the framework of the struggle for hegemony among the 
Greek powers – principally Athens and Sparta – Rhodes not only became one of 
the prime naval bases, from which support could also be lent to land operations 
in Carian territory, but it also fulfilled an important function in controlling ac-
cess to the South Aegean and as a stopping-off point on the Egyptian grain route 
to Attica
1
. As regards internal affairs, ever since the year 408/7, when the island 
had attained synoikismos, or political unification, around the recently founded 
polis of Rhodes – a process accompanied since 411 by the establishment of an 
oligarchy and the breakaway from the Athenian arche under the leadership of 
the renowned athlete Dorieus, a member of the Ialysian family of the Diagore-
ans
2
 –the situation had been one of constant confrontation between democrats 
and oligarchs, leading, well into the fourth century, to outbreaks of stasis or civil 
conflict. 
In the sailing season of 396, shortly before the start of the Corinthian War, 
in which from 395 to 386 Sparta and the Peloponnesian League would be con-
fronted by the synedrion of Corinth (led by Boeotia, Athens, Argos and Corinth, 
and financed by Persia)
3
, the citizens of Rhodes switched alliances once more 
when, apparently by non-violent means, they expelled the Peloponnesian fleet 
 
1
 Thuc. VIII 35, 2; Ps. Dem. LVI passim. 
2
 Thuc. VIII 44, 1-3; Diod. XIII 38, 5; 75, 1; Strab. XIV 2, 9-10. See especially David 1986; 
cfr. Bruce 1961, 167; Berthold 1980, 33; Coppola 2005, 291-293. According to Gabrielsen 2000, 
however, this gradual process of synoikism never finished and Rhodes would have been in fact a 
federal state. 
3
 For a recent analysis of this Panhellenic conflict, Fornis 2008.  
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and welcomed in its place the Persian fleet of Pharnabazus and Conon; scarcely 
a year later, Conon was involved in an internal insurrection (ἐπανάστασις) that 
toppled the Diagorean régime to install a democratic order
4
. With Rhodes as his 
base of operations, Conon would obtain a decisive victory near Cnidus in Au-
gust 394, putting an end to Lacedemonian naval hegemony and, with it, the 
presence of Spartan harmosts and garrisons in the Aegean islands and in most of 
the Greek cities on the coast of Asia Minor
5
. 
In the sailing season of 391 the outbreak of a new stasis in Rhodes – in fact 
a re-eruption or second phase of the civil conflict which had taken place four 
years previously – offered the Spartans the opportunity to recover this important 
enclave and convert it into the spear-point of its counter-offensive in the Aege-
an
6
. For our information on this factional struggle we are dependent on the ac-
counts by Xenophon and Diodorus Siculus, the latter of whom, as we know, was 
inspired by the work of Ephorus, who in turn used as his main source for these 
years the anonymous author of the Hellenica Oxyrhynchia, of which only a few 
fragments are extant. The fact is, however, that these accounts not only contain 
discrepancies with respect to each other – each being internally consistent – but 
can also virtually be regarded as openly irreconcilable. When forced to choose, 
most modern scholars have opted for the Athenian historian, not only because he 
was writing at the time of the events but because he offers a great wealth of de-
tail and explanation, unusually so in view of the slight attention he generally 
pays to developments in the war at sea. However, some scholars have attempted 
to weave both traditions together in a forced and scarcely convincing manner, 
without even pointing out the discrepancies between the sources, selectively 
picking elements of each account while leaving loose ends untied
7
. As for Dio-
dorus, few authors appear to give him complete credit
8
. 
Let us consider, then, the testimony of the two ancient historians. From 
 
4
 For all these events and their influence on the outbreak of the Corinthian War, see Fornis 
2007, together with the previous bibliography. 
5
 Conon, who is honoured everywhere, is granted privileges and has statues erected, is cele-
brated in contemporary and later Greek literature as the liberator of Greece from the Spartan yoke, 
even though he had continued to serve the Great King, a mercenary under the orders of the satrap 
Pharnabazus (see, in general, Fornis 2009a, where the sources for the naval battle of Cnidus are 
specified and its consequences analysed). On land, however, the Spartan war machine had dis-
played its traditional efficiency in the pitched battles of Nemea and Coroneia, also in the summer of 
394, on which the continuation of its continental hegemony was built (cfr. Fornis 2003). 
6
 Hamilton 1979, 293; Funke 1980a, 95; David 1984, 276, 281. Berthold 1980, 39 puts back 
the outbreak of stasis to the winter of 391/0. 
7
 Momigliano 1936, esp. 51-54; Accame 1951, 132, 136-137; Funke 1980b, esp. 65-66; Da-
vid 1984, 280-284; Falkner 1992, 253-254; Tuplin 1993, 172-173; Debord 1999, 258-261. 
8
 Lanzillotta 1981, 278-279; Hornblower 1982, 124; Gehrke 1985, 137-138; Gabrielsen 
2000, 190 with n. 67, and, especially, Westlake 1983 (infra). 
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both it can be concluded that the subversive movement against the democratic 
system that was then in place – with no apparent instigation from Sparta but 
possibly encouraged by the renewal of the Lacedemonian offensive on the Asia 
Minor coast following the failure of the peace negotiations in autumn-winter 
392/1
9
 – stemmed from oligarchs exiled by the régime, who maintained control 
over part of the island. Beyond this point of coincidence, their accounts share 
little in common. 
According to Xenophon, the group formed by the richest citizens (οἱ 
πλουσιώτεροι), banished by the demos, requested help from Sparta, whose au-
thorities, aware of the strategic importance of the island, dispatched eight ves-
sels, at the end of summer or in the autumn, under Ecdicus, the recently elected 
nauarchos for 390/89
10
. By the time he reached Cnidus, the Rhodian democrats 
had taken over the whole island, and Ecdicus therefore decided to wait there and 
request reinforcements from Sparta. At the beginning of the following year
11
 the 
ephors decided to send Teleutias, the stepbrother of Agesilaus, from the Corin-
thian Gulf – technically not as ναύαρχος but as harmost, or else with special 
powers
12
 –, at the head of twelve ships that were joined by another seven at Sa-
mos, which was now under an oligarchic régime; on reaching Cnidus, Teleutias 
replaced Ecdicus, who returned to Sparta, while Teleutias set sail for Rhodes in 
 
9
 Westlake 1983, 240; David 1984, 276, 283 is of the opinion, not without numerous doubts, 
that the oligarchs might have acted after ascertaining the hostile attitude of Tiribazus towards Ath-
ens, and towards Conon in particular, before the arrival of news that the satrap had been discredited 
by the Great King. The unsuccessful peace negotiations held first at Sardes and then in Sparta high-
lighted the Machtpolitik of each of the warring sides, even within the Corinthian alliance itself (see 
Fornis 2005). 
10
 Xen. Hell. IV 8, 20. 
11
 After Agesilaus and Teleutias had once again taken over the Corinthian port of Lechaeus 
and the Long Walls that joined it to the city of Corinth, at the end of the summer of 391 (Xen Hell. 
IV 4, 18-19 and Ages. 2, 17). According to Cawkwell 1976, 273, Teleutias was still able to sail at 
the end of that year, but he could hardly have had time to reach Rhodes via Samos and Cnidus –
capturing an Athenian squadron en route– before the winter’s termination of sailing. Along with a 
substantial number of modern critics, we believe that Cawkwell crams an excessive number of 
events into the year 391. 
12
 As is well known, the navarchy cannot be repeated. On as many as three occasions Xeno-
phon depicts Teleutias as having responsibilities in the fleet, in only the third of which, in 387/6, 
does he identify him explicitly as nauarchos (Hell. V 1, 13; cfr. IV 4, 19 and 8, 11). Even taking 
into account that the Athenian historian is often imprecise and vague in his application of the term, 
we must accept, along with Pareti 1961, 98-101, that for the rest of the time he was harmost, naval 
commander or some type of extraordinary command (for Stylianou 1988, 468 Teleutias in fact was 
probably never admiral, since he regards as corrupt the passage of Xenophon in which the title is 
applied to him); contra Caroline Falkner 1992, 254, 317, who in her «tentative list of Spartan 
navarchs», an appendix of her doctoral thesis, includes Teleutias three times, considering him to be 
an individual who, in view of his relationship and close proximity to the all-powerful Agesilaus, 
could have represented an exception to the law. 
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command of a total of twenty-seven vessels
13
. During the voyage he captured 
ten Athenian triremes which Philocrates was leading to Cyprus to support the 
revolt of Evagoras of Salamis against the Great King
14
. Once the booty they had 
seized had been sold at Cnidus, Teleutias headed for Rhodes to “go to the aid of 
those with whom he shared the same ideology”. 
Spartan activity in the Aegean and the Hellespont, which had intensified 
with the threatening presence of Teleutias in Rhodes, was the cause of profound 
concern among the Athenian demos, which dispatched Thrasybulus of Steiria at 
the head of a float of forty triremes. Xenophon claims that Thrasybulus felt in-
capable of dislodging the Rhodian exiles from the fortress where they had taken 
refuge, supported by Teleutias’s ships, and that, since he was aware that the 
democrats were in the majority and in control of the cities, he left Rhodes and 
sailed for the Hellespont and North Aegean as he “thought that he could accom-
plish some useful service for his state” (ἐνόµισε καταπρᾶξαι ἄν τι τῇ πόλει 
ἀγαθόν)
15
. After making significant political and economic gains in these areas, 
which point clearly to a revival of Athenian imperialism, the Steirian sailed 
south, to be killed near the river Eurymedon, in Aspendus (Pamphilia), as a re-
sult of which the Athenians sent Agyrrius to replace him
16
. During this time the 
struggle continued in Rhodes, with the exiles and their Spartan allies entrenched 
in a fortress, the only fresh development being that Hierax, the navarch for 
 
13
 Westlake 1983, 242 stresses the contrast drawn by Xenophon between Ecdicus and Teleu-
tias when he suggests that the former might have been inefficient in carrying out his duties; this 
forms part of Westlake’s theory that the Athenian historian gave excessive and undeserved promi-
nence to Teleutias –Diodorus does not even mention him–, with whom he was linked in a close 
bond of friendship through Agesilaus. We cannot share the notion that behind the dispatching of 
Teleutias there lay renewed plans for Asian conquest on the part of Agesilaus, as is suggested by 
Falkner 1992, 253. 
14
 Xen. Hell. IV 8, 24. 
15
 Westlake 1983, 244-245 rejects Xenophon’s explanation outright to put forward the hy-
pothesis that Thrasybulus’s decision was based on the urgent need to obtain funds for the project of 
imperial reconstruction in Athens, as modern historians tend to recognize, with the substantial dif-
ference that the idea did not come from the Steirian, who was simply obeying a mandate from the 
Assembly; Westlake adduces as a possible additional reason that Thrasybulus was also preparing 
himself financially to cope with what it was assumed would be a long and hard siege on the Rhodi-
an oligarchs (though this reason is to be found in Xenophon himself, in Hell. IV 8, 30). We cannot 
subscribe this author’s thesis that Xenophon was deliberately hiding the objectives of the expedi-
tion; it is well known that the Athenian strategoi received broad orders from the Ecclesia which left 
them with a certain margin for manoeuvre, as long as they did not act against the interests of Ath-
ens and bore in mind that the people reserved for itself mechanisms of control over these generals 
(euthynai, the possibility of re-election, etc.). Pritchett 1974, 50-52 has correctly observed that the 
image of condottiero with which some modern historians have endowed Thrasybulus is not backed 
up by the sources. 
16
 For an appraisal of this notable campaign by Thrasybulus and its internal consequences at 
Athens, see now Fornis 2009b. 
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389/8
17
, had replaced Teleutias at the head of the fleet, to remain there until the 
arrival of the following navarch (388/7), Antalcidas
18
. 
In Diodorus’s account, on the other hand, it is the Laconizers (οἱ 
λακωνίζοντες) who gain the upper hand in the stasis, killing and expelling 
many of the democrats who supported Athens; even so, fearing that some citi-
zens might rebel (εὐλαβούµενοι µή τῶν πολιτῶν νεωτερίσωσιν), they request-
ed reinforcements from Sparta, which dispatched seven triremes under Eudoci-
mus – Xenophon’s Ecdicus –, Diphilas – in Xenophon, Diphridas – and 
Philodocus. With this fleet the Lacedemonians won Samos and Cnidus and se-
cured the domination of Rhodes, these being three naval bases which were stra-
tegic for the control of the Aegean and which would contribute with twenty-
seven ships and crews to the Spartan naval offensive. Finally, in a passage de-
tached from those before it and incorporated into the account of the events of 
390, the Sicilian historian offers his account of the death of Thrasybulus in As-
pendus – again with Xenophon as his source –, after which the Athenian trier-
archs headed for Rhodes in order to support the banished philo-Athenian demo-
crats, who, in their internal struggle against the Laconizing oligarchs who 
controlled the city, had made themselves strong in a φρούριον or hill-fort. Dio-
dorus, like Xenophon, does not return to the Rhodian stasis, which appears not 
to have come to an end until the Kingʼs Peace guaranteed the autonomia of the 
cities and put an end to outside interference under the auspices of Sparta
19
. 
Diodorus’s version suffers a priori from the great disadvantage of being 
much more succinct and presenting the chronological errors that are usual in this 
author, which in this case are not insignificant, as he confuses the Asian expedi-
tions of the Spartans Thibron and Diphridas and, more seriously, brings forward 
Thrasybulus’s departure for the Hellespont to the year 392, that is, by about two 
years
20
. Consequently, in the context of a disjointed narrative, there is no cause-
and-effect connection between Thrasybulus’s campaign and the events in 
Rhodes; in other words, Thrasybulus was not sent by the Athenian demos to 
help the Rhodian democrats. Secondly, in Diodorus the oligarchs are successful 
in their undertaking and manage to dislodge the democrats from power, expel-
ling them from the city and causing a bloodbath in an attempted counter-
 
17
 Xen. Hell. V 1, 3. 
18
 Xen. Hell. IV 8, 20-30; V 1, 5-6. According to Tuplin 1993, 78, Xenophon gradually loses 
interest in the affairs of Rhodes as Sparta gains the upper hand in the struggle for control of the is-
land (it is the leitmotif of Tuplin, against the majority view among modern historians, that Xeno-
phon does not highlight the achievements of Sparta but paints a more diffuse picture of them). 
19
 Diod. XIV 97, 1-4; 99, 4-5. 
20
 The years of the Corinthian War present a particular chronological disorder in the Biblio-
theca Historica, the result of attempting to adapt the peculiar narrative structure of Ephorus, whose 
history of the Greek world followed geographic criteria. 
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revolution. The second part of his account does not differ so greatly from that of 
Xenophon, whom he appears to summarize in a confused manner, ignoring cer-
tain events and presenting erroneous information, such as the names of the 
Lacedemonian commanders or the number of ships. 
Now, some scholars have sought to confirm the validity of Diodorus’s ac-
count in two passages with no time reference in Aristotleʼs Politics in which he 
relates how the most powerful – for whom he uses the terms γνώριµοι, nota-
bles, and τριήραρχοι, trierarchs or trireme captains –, harassed by the dema-
gogues, who aimed both to introduce a salary for armed service and, at the same 
time, to impede the repayment to the trierarchs of the sums owed to them, even 
taking out court cases against them, got together to strike a blow against democ-
racy
21
. First of all, it is no easy matter to identify beyond any doubt the factional 
struggle described by Aristotle with the testimony of Diodorus, since the only 
point they have in common is the apparent victory of the privileged classes in 
their attempt to introduce an oligarchic régime – there is no sign at all of Spartan 
or Athenian intervention – and, besides, the Rhodian polis, both before and after 
the synecism, suffered similar clashes on several occasions. This is attested, for 
example, by Demosthenes’s fourteenth oration, On the Freedom of the Rhodi-
ans. Nor should it be forgotten – and Tuplin has taken it upon himself to remind 
us of this
22
 – that the interest of the philosopher is merely a social, not a histori-
ographic one, that is, he is much more concerned with the conduct of the dema-
gogues than with the precise facts which shape the historical event. Moreover, 
Aristotle does not set out the facts but has recourse to brachylogical keys that 
presuppose in the reader a knowledge of the events. This results in these passag-
es being so intricate and obscure that Nino Luraghi was led to conclude that the 
two passages are integrated into a four-part chiastic structure made up of the 
four examples with which Aristotle attempts to illustrate his theorizing, in such a 
way that the first of them governs the others; as it so happens that the first of 
them shows “la sollevazione degli esclusi dalla politeia contro il gruppo oligar-
chico al potere”, as a consequence of the καταπρόνεσις (contempt, disdain) on 
the part of the gnorimoi, according to the Stagirian, the other three thereby pre-
sumably do the same and therefore Aristotle must have been referring to the 
 
21
 Arist. Pol. V 1302 b 21-24; 1304 b 27-31. The connection was established by Newman 
1902, 299 and developed by Momigliano 1936, 51-54, who eliminated other possible staseis as 
being due to external interference; it has also been accepted by Funke 1980b, 65-66; Lanzillotta 
1981, 278; Westlake 1983, 246-247; David 1984, 273-275, 281-282; Gehrke 1985, 138; Gabrielsen 
2000, 203 n. 67. Contra Berthold 1980, 39, 43, Hornblower 1982, 127 and Radicke 1995, 192-195, 
who place the Aristotelian episode around 355, while Luraghi 1998, 121-123 and Coppola 2005, 
294, 297-300 suggest the year 395.  
22
 Tuplin 1993, 173. 
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toppling of an oligarchy in Rhodes
23
. And finally, of no small importance is the 
fact that, if the arguments that tilt the scales in favour of the testimony of Diodo-
rus are accepted, this would imply that Xenophon was deliberately intending to 
falsify the facts – in particular to hide the reasons underlying Thrasybulus’s ex-
pedition to the Hellespont, even at the cost of not stating publicly that the Lace-
demonians controlled the extremely important island of Rhodes –, and not only 
to silence or colour them, an imputation we consider to be exaggerated and un-
fair to the Athenian historian, with all his prejudices and limitations. 
As for the war in Asia, Ecdicus had been accompanied in his travels by 
Diphridas, who had been entrusted with the mission of reuniting what was left 
of Thibron’s army and recruiting fresh troops with whom to continue fighting 
the satrap Strutas. A stroke of luck placed in Diphridas’s hands the daughter of 
Strutas and her husband, Tigranes, who were travelling towards Sardes; the sub-
stantial ransom paid was used by the Spartan to pay his mercenaries’ wages and 
to consolidate the Spartan presence in Ionia
24
. For this reason the Lacedemonian 
counter-offensive in 391 and 390 may be considered a success, given that it had 
enabled Sparta to recover a good number of the towns lost after the battle of 
Cnidus. Even in the case of Rhodes, which we consider had not been recovered, 
the internal dissent which was the scourge of the island prevented it from play-
ing a strategic role in the final years of the conflict. In fact, it was in the area of 
the Straits linking the Aegean and the Black Sea that the Corinthian War would 
finally be resolved
25
. 
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Abstract 
 
The island of Rhodes was a naval base of great strategic interest for the Greek states 
fighting for hegemony, especially Athens and Sparta in the Classical period. This 
situation influenced the Rhodian civic community, where there were several episodes of 
stasis between democrats and oligarchs, supported respectively by Athenians and 
Spartans. In this paper we focus on one of these episodes, in the framework of the so-
called Corinthian War (395-386 B.C.), on the development and implications of which 
our two main sources (Xenophon and Diodorus of Sicily) disagree. 
